3 devolution, rather than independence. However, the United Kingdom (UK) government was unwilling to countenance a second referendum question on further devolution -ostensibly, inter alia, because independence and further devolution were distinct constitutional issues, 11 but also presumably because they thought that on a straightforward choice between independence and the status quo, independence would be comfortably defeated. In any case, as unionists frequently pointed out, further devolution was already being delivered via the Scotland Act 2012, which had been enacted in response to the Calman Commission's recommendations.
If by 2011 there was no strongly-felt constitutional grievance to which independence was the answer, nor was the subsequent referendum debate conducted primarily in constitutional terms. As other chapters in this volume have noted, 12 once the debate moved beyond the early preoccupation with process issues, it was dominated by discussion of the substantiveand particularly the economic -effects of independence on public policy in Scotland and on the lives of its residents. This again contrasts sharply with devolution, which proceeded on a clearly articulated analysis of the defects in Scotland's then governance arrangements and of the constitutional right of the Scottish people to secure enhanced self-government.
4
The substantive nature of the referendum debate is largely attributable to the fact that the Scottish Government chose to base its case for constitutional change not around an existentialist nationalist claim -that Scotland, being a nation, should also be a state (although such arguments undoubtedly were made by independence supporters, for instance in claims that independence would make Scotland a 'normal' country), or that independence was necessary to preserve Scottish identity. Rather, the appeal was to a utilitarian nationalism, which saw independence as a tool to achieve a better society. 14 This approach had the advantage of enabling many people who did not identify as Nationalists (at least with a capital N), and who continued to feel some degree of Britishness, to support the Yes campaign on the basis that an independent Scotland would better able to deliver progressive policy outcomes. Its disadvantage was that it was vulnerable to counter-arguments that an independent Scotland would in fact be less able to achieve such policy outcomes, 15 and to claims -made particularly by Labour politicians -that the constitutional debate was a distraction from the real business of improving the lives of Scottish people.
However, what these counter-arguments arguably failed fully to appreciate, and therefore adequately to address, was the fact that the instrumental case for independence was underpinned by a critique of Scotland's current governance arrangements. Except insofar as it was based on crude arguments about the assignment of tax revenues or the allocation of natural resources (arguments which were undoubtedly made, but which operated more as reasons why Scotland could be independent, rather why it should), the instrumental case 14 See in particular N. Sturgeon 'Bringing the Powers Home to Build a Better Nation', Speech at Strathclyde University, 3 December 2012. 15 See Gallagher, in this volume, and for a more optimistic assessment of the likely economic effects of independence, see Scott, in this volume.
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necessarily assumed that an independent Scotland would be able to govern itself differently and better than would be possible if it were to remain part of the UK.
Thus, contrary to initial impressions, there was a constitutional case for independence, which was made with varying degrees of explicitness. Moreover, this was a case which strongly echoed the constitutional case that had been made for devolution a generation earlier.
The aim of this chapter is to elucidate that constitutional case, which, I contend, was based around four sets of (intertwined, but conceptually distinct) arguments: about a democratic deficit; about effective governance; about the place of Scotland in the UK's territorial constitution; and about the constitution of an independent Scotland. The chapter also seeks to evaluate the strength of these arguments, particularly in the light of the referendum itself and subsequent events. It is important to appreciate that the referendum was not merely an opportunity to pass judgment on Scotland's constitutional arrangements, but was itself a constitutionally significant event which shaped perceptions of those arrangements. Thus, the referendum debate has served to focus and intensify constitutional dissatisfaction, which subsequent opinion polls and political developments suggest has certainly not weakened and may even have become stronger. 16 The argument advanced in this chapter is that while none of the four constitutional claims made by Yes campaigners individually amounts to a compelling case for independence, cumulatively they seem likely to become harder to resist, particularly if post-referendum political and constitutional trends continue.
II. A democratic deficit
The most frequently invoked constitutional argument in favour of independence was the idea of a democratic deficit; in other words, that independence is the only way to guarantee that 16 See What Scotland Thinks at <http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-would-you-vote-in-the-in-thescottish-independence-referendum-if-held-now-a#line>.
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Scotland always gets the government it votes for. 17 The claimed democratic deficit in Scotland's then system of government was of course one of the key justifications for the establishment of the Scottish Parliament. It was the election of four successive Conservative governments at Westminster between 1979 and 1997, during a period in which the party had only minority -and declining -electoral support in Scotland, 18 which provided a clear rationale for devolution 19 and persuaded a substantial majority of voters to support it. The ability of the government to impose unpopular policies (such as the poll tax) on Scotland came to be perceived not merely as 'the product of an occasional aberration by a particular British government [but as] a consequence of flaws in the system of government.' 20 However, the Scottish Government argued, devolution 'has only been a partial solution to the democratic deficit.' 21 Significant policy issues, on which Scottish preferences might diverge from those of voters in the rest of the UK (rUK), continue to be dealt with at UK level, and this necessarily must be the case even under the most generous devolution arrangements.
Moreover, Scottish policy-making in devolved areas continues to be constrained by policy preferences at UK level, most significantly to the extent that the funding of the devolved institutions remains tied to expenditure levels in England via the Barnett formula, but also through UK government control of European Union (EU) and other international decisionmaking, and through the continued existence of GB-wide political party structures and policy communities. This was a point emphasized by the Scottish Government in the latter stages of 17 The key assumption which underpins the democratic deficit argument is that Scotland is a distinct political unit, and indeed the primary political unit in which democratic majorities are to be calculated. This is turn rests upon an assumption that Scotland is a nation with a right to political self-determination. In this basic sense, the instrumentalist case for independence is as much a nationalist position as the existentialist one. In fact, the claim that Scotland is a nation is not controversial. Nationhood in general is a concept which is notoriously difficult to define, since it rests on subjective perception rather than on purely objective criteria. But
Scotland's claim to national identity is sufficiently well accepted, internally uncontested, and This kind of argument is arguably misconceived, at least in the Scottish case, because it misunderstands both the nature of the UK and the nature of Scottish nationalism. Keating argues that the UK is better understood as a 'plurinational' rather than a 'multinational' state.
In other words, it is a state in which people have plural national identities, not merely one in which distinct national identities co-exist.
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'Britishness' is therefore itself a national identity, albeit based on allegiance to a political order, rather than a common ethnic inheritance. However, the nationalism espoused by the SNP is equally a civic nationalism. 37 and ch 9. However, the degree of divergence should not be exaggerated, and Jackson also points out that there is greater diversity in political cultures within the rUK than a focus on the UK level might suggest -B.
Jackson 'The Political Thought of Scottish Nationalism' (2014) 85 Pol Q 50 at 53 -54. 34 Keating and Harvey Small Nations (n 33) at 18. is its basis in an explicit assertion of the sovereignty of the Scottish people (reinforced by popular consent through a referendum), and the platform it provides for the accentuation and proliferation of political, institutional, and policy difference, and the assertion of further autonomy claims. 47 If based upon a pure autonomy claim, it is of course much more difficult to set coherent and durable limits to Scottish self-government. Indeed, the Scottish
Constitutional Convention in its 1989 consultation document, Towards a Scottish Parliament
-a document which endorsed the Claim of Right but which was subtly different in its analysis -expressly acknowledged that it followed from the principle of popular sovereignty that the Scottish people could legitimately choose to be independent (although it did not necessarily follow that they would or should do so), and it also accepted that it could be difficult to draw a hard line between the legislative competences of the Scottish Parliament and matters to be reserved to Westminster.
48
The democratic deficit argument therefore has considerable normative force as a justification for independence and not merely for devolution. However, it still cannot be regarded as 14 is a logical consequence of the doctrine of self-determination that its exercise may be limited by the equal rights of others', 49 in this case the rights of those who maintain a British national identity.
This cannot be taken to mean that the desire of a majority of Scots to secede could be vetoed by a contrary desire of a British majority to maintain the territorial integrity of the UK, since that would be to subordinate the rights of a national minority to the wishes of the larger group. Indeed, it has never been seriously suggested in the UK context that issues of territorial self-determination are for anyone other than those living in the territory in question to determine (although the interests of the rUK in the process and consequences of such decisions have certainly been asserted). 50 Instead, it means that the continued British identity of people living in Scotland has to be taken into account.
In fact, this is potentially problematic for proponents of independence, since it is clear that become somewhat stronger in recent years, presumably as a direct result of the threat to that identity posed by the referendum itself.
To the extent that Britishness is still regarded as a relevant political identity, then the democratic deficit argument loses much of its force. If certain issues are regarded as being legitimately determined at UK level, then the fact that voters in Scottish constituencies sometimes end up with a UK government they did not support is no more constitutionally relevant than similar regional disparities in voting patterns elsewhere in the UK. 53 Equally, if
Scottish voters choose to support (regional) political parties which have no chance of forming a UK-wide government, then that is no more constitutionally problematic than a choice to support any other minority party.
However, one major difficulty with this argument is the assumption that Scottish and British national identities map unproblematically onto the distinction between devolved and reserved matters, or that they could ever do so. Political convergence and divergence between
Scotland and the rUK is almost certain to cut across that boundary, wherever it is drawn, meaning that it is likely to be a continuing source of potential tension. Accordingly, unless territorial difference on reserved matters, as well as devolved matters, is handled carefully, there is an ongoing risk that policy difference on reserved matters may escalate into a legitimacy deficit, particularly if the parties in power at UK and/or Scottish level have a political interest in provoking conflict. 
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also further embedded Scotland rather than the UK as the main political frame of reference.
The referendum debate was emphatically a Scottish debate: it was a debate conducted within Scotland, with limited and largely unhelpful input from the rUK; and it was a debate about the future of Scotland, and the best interests of the Scottish people, not one about the UK.
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As more power is devolved to Scotland in the wake of the referendum, the political salience of Scotland is likely to increase, and that of the UK to decrease, even further. Indeed, there are already signs that Scottish politics are beginning to trump UK politics -for instance, the willingness of a majority of Scottish voters at the 2015 general election to vote on Scottish rather than British lines, 56 and the prominence of devolved matters such as health in preelection debates, or the fact that the Scottish Labour party has felt the need to differentiate itself from the UK party on a reserved matter such as the renewal of Trident ahead of the 2016 Holyrood election.
As the political relevance of Britishness declines, it also becomes vulnerable to the argument that there are ways of giving expression to it other than through continued common statehood. For instance, the Scottish Government during the referendum campaign sought to recast Britishness as a geographical and cultural rather than a political identity, and to stress 55 
III. Effective governance
In fact, the democratic argument for independence was combined with a second argument about effective governance. However, the bigger problem for advocates of independence is that it is patently not always true that smaller governmental units are more effective. On the contrary, there are numerous reasons why the pooling of sovereignty in larger political units may lead to better policy outcomes. These include economies of scale -in particular, increased policy-making and regulatory capacities, 65 and a greater ability to manage physical and economic risks by pooling and sharing resources over a larger population base 66 -as well as policy spill-overs and externalities, which create co-ordination and collective action problems in the absence of joint decision-making machinery. In addition, independent states face external constraintsthrough international law and the exposure to international markets -which bear particularly heavily on small states, and from which they may be more effectively shielded as a sub-state unit in a larger entity. 67 In short, de jure power does not always amount to de facto power. 62 See National Conversation (n 9) at ix, 9; Scotland's Future (n 17) at 48, 360. 63 See Keating and Harvie Small States (n 33) at ch 3. 64 Keating and Harvie Small States (n 33) at 69. 65 Keating and Harvie Small States (n 33) at 68. 66 See Gallagher in this volume. 67 The issue of whether an independent Scotland would be able to continue to charge university tuition fees to rUK students, but not to Scottish-domiciled students is a good example of this.
In practice, the desirability of continued integration was accepted by the Scottish 23 example, the rationale for the Union has clearly changed over time, from an initial concern with trade and security, through a common commitment to empire and the Protestant religion, to a more recent concern to ensure a high standard of social protection through a common Welfare State -a commitment which itself is now arguably on the wane. 80 Similarly, even those functions which, it is generally agreed, would have to be retained at UK level within any continuing Union -borders and citizenship; foreign affairs and defence; a common currency and single market -are subject to a range of external constraints and co-operative arrangements, which highlight the contingency of any territorial division of powers. 81 See Scottish Government National Conversation (n 9) at 8. 82 See in particular Gallagher in this volume; see also Jackson Political Thought (n 33) at 55 -56. 83 Scotland Analysis: Conclusions (n 70) at para 1.16. 84 Scotland Analysis: Conclusions (n 70) at paras 1.16 -1.17.
To some extent, the UK Government's attitude to post-independence co-operation might be thought to have lacked credibility; 85 a position adopted for tactical reasons which, as the history of British relations with the Republic of Ireland may suggest, might have changed once faced with the reality of independence. 86 However, the more serious underlying point is that a relationship based on self-interest, where either party may at any time choose to withdraw from it, is inherently unstable, and not therefore conducive to the making of necessary compromises. The acceptance of permanent restrictions on sovereigntysacrificing the right to 'exit' in return for the exercise of 'voice' in a larger organization 87 -may therefore be a necessary price to pay for deeper and more meaningful co-operation.
Again, a number of responses are possible. Once again, the difficulty is to find a way of dividing powers that will prove to be stable and mutually acceptable. Approaching the issue from the perspective of what powers must be retained at the centre in order to maintain solidarity across the Union provides a decision-making criterion, but it does not necessarily make it any easier to agree upon the answer. This is clearly illustrated by post-referendum disputes over the acceptable extent of fiscal and welfare devolution, and over the acceptable degree of variation in the provision and protection of fundamental rights. It also remains necessary to reassure Scots that they do have a meaningful voice in the exercise of reserved powers. This leads to the broader point that solidarity is not just a question of where powers are exercised, but also how they are exercised. Solidarity may be undermined within a political union by political behaviour which weakens common commitments -for instance, attacks on welfare provision, or erosion of citizenship rights -or which stokes resentment 85 See Mitchell Scottish Question (n 42) at 278. 86 See McHarg, Scotland and the UK (n 75).
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about perceived unfair treatment of certain territorial groups -such as more generous public spending in Scotland enabled by an unequal funding formula. 88 Finally, if the threat of exit is a destabilizing factor in relationships between states, it must also remain a problem in any UK constitutional order in which the right of the Scottish people (or other national groups) to self-determination is taken seriously.
89
This brings us to the third element of the constitutional case for independence, which is the problematic nature of the UK's territorial constitution.
IV. The United Kingdom's territorial constitution
The argument that aspirations for greater Scottish autonomy can be more satisfactorily accommodated within a reformed Union than through independence itself involves a constitutional claim. It must assume that a constitutional settlement can be reached which provides adequate recognition for Scottish autonomy and territorial diversity, yet which ensures sufficient constitutional cohesion to legitimate UK-level decision-making and hold the state together over the long term. Part of the case for independence, however, is that the UK's territorial constitution does not adequately recognize the plurinational character of the state.
In fact, in the wake of the referendum, there is substantial agreement amongst informed observers that reforms need to go beyond the transfer of additional powers to the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government to include reforms to the territorial constitution more broadly. 90 In this sense, the constitutional discontents underpinning support for independence 88 Cf Mullen Independence Referendum (n 80) at 638. 89 See further Tickell in this volume. In fact, the standard response to complaints about lack of constitutional recognition is to point to constitutional practice which, it is claimed, embodies a strong political commitment to the permanence of devolution, and clear acknowledgment of the fact that Scotland is in control of its own constitutional destiny. Indeed -as the Scottish Constitutional Convention eventually came to accept 95 -it can be argued that Scottish autonomy is just as well, if not better, protected under the UK's political constitution than in comparable written constitutional orders -the unusual (in comparative terms) willingness of the UK government to concede a referendum on independence being a case in point. 96 Indeed, it might be argued that political commitment is more important than legal guarantees, since in the extreme and improbable political circumstances in which abolition of the Scottish Parliament might be contemplated, legal guarantees would be unlikely to save it.
All that accepted, however, political commitments lack the symbolic reassurance that legal entrenchment would deliver. In addition, the gap between the legal and political constitutions is not without practical significance. 97 The The second problem with the current territorial constitution is its lack of attention to shared rule as a counterbalance to the dispersal of power through devolution. Mechanisms for shared rule are important, both to deal with the inevitable policy spill-overs, functional overlaps, and competence disputes that arise in any system of territorially-divided power, and also, as has been argued above, to take account of territorial differences on issues which remain reserved to the centre. However, as Nicola McEwen discusses in her chapter, The basic difficulty in responding adequately to the problem of shared rule is one of constitutional asymmetry. In part, this refers to the asymmetrical nature of the devolution arrangements (and in particular, the fact that England has no devolved government), which 106 The only explicitly territorial mechanisms at UK level -the Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland Offices, and their corresponding parliamentary select committees -predate devolution. 107 Calman Commission (n 10) at part 4; Smith Commission (n 100) at foreword and paras 28 -31. 
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has allowed devolution to be regarded as a set of discrete and self-contained constitutional reforms, with no implications for the constitution as a whole. But the more fundamental problem is the asymmetry of the state itself: as MacCormick put it, 'there would be a severe democratic deficit in any blocking arrangement that enabled the two-elevenths [of the UK population] to protect their position against the nine.'
109
The final problem with the current territorial constitution -and which is emphasized more by unionists than nationalists -is its lack of reciprocity. In part, this is also a problem of asymmetry and concerns the legitimacy problems and inherent instability caused by divergent devolution arrangements 110 -and in particular, the perceived injustice resulting from the lack of any separate political representation for England. 111 But it is also refers to the absence of any explicit mechanisms to tie Scotland -and the other devolved nations -into the Union.
112
In the absence of any legally recognized right to self-determination, there is also no clear understanding of the limits to that right: for instance, how often and in what circumstances it might be legitimate to hold an independence referendum -nor any clear statement of the principles upon which the Union is based, which might be invoked to resolve disagreements about the appropriate territorial distribution of power.
109 Questioning Sovereignty (n 36) at 195. This aspect of the territorial constitution has been almost entirely ignored post-referendum.
Reforms to the devolution arrangements in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland are proceeding through discrete and unconnected processes, while reforms in England -EVEL and the misleadingly-named 'city devolution' programme 113 -are in no way commensurate with the arrangements for self-government in the other parts of the UK. Any notion of an over-arching framework for devolution thus remains radically under-developed.
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The essential problem here is the continued dominance of a political rather than a constitutional logic to devolution.
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The problems of territorial governance being addressed through devolution have been viewed primarily through a political (and sometimes -as in the case of EVEL -a party political) lens, to be resolved as best suits local circumstances, with no concern for their overall coherence or long-term implications.
To adequately address these problems would require a root and branch overhaul of the territorial constitution probably including, as the Bingham Centre has recently argued, a written constitution. 116 Yet such a prospect seems wholly unrealistic. In the first place, there appears to be no political appetite for anything other than piecemeal reform. Any attempt to 'crystallize' 117 the territorial constitution would be a major change to the deep structure of the Secondly, even if it were a realistic prospect, it is highly questionable whether a comprehensive constitutional resettlement would be desirable. The value of the political constitution lies not just in its flexibility but also in its (sometimes strategic) ambiguity, which allows competing understandings of the constitution to be maintained simultaneously without having to be finally resolved. 119 The territorial constitution above all has operated as an 'incompletely theorized agreement'; 120 it has been 'a protean concept, taking different forms in different places.' 121 Any attempt to define and codify the Union therefore risks either being so bland and abstract as to be pointless, 122 or else exposing rather than resolving territorial disagreement. It may also act as an obstacle to further evolution at a time when understandings of the territorial character of the state are in flux.
In these circumstances, evolutionary change -or 'muddling through' 124 -may be the best option on offer, and may eventually arrive at a stable equilibrium. For instance, the claimed impossibility of achieving legal entrenchment of the Scottish Parliament arguably underestimates the extent to which the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty has been qualified in recent years, 125 and may therefore be further qualified in future, including as a result of devolution. Nevertheless, in an evolutionary constitution, there can be no certainty that any statutory statement of the permanence of the devolved institutions would have that effect. The UK constitution is thus, by its nature, resistant to explicit steering, and in that sense the territorial constitution may accurately be described as unreformable. Moreover, in the meantime, the management of territorial relations must remain a fundamentally political matter. While attitudes to the future of the Union remain deeply polarized, there will be an ever-present risk that political disagreement may explode into constitutional crisis, whether over issues such as the scope or exercise of devolved powers, broader constitutional questions such as EU withdrawal, or merely the direction of public policy.
V. The constitution of an independent Scotland
The final element of the constitutional case for independence presented it not merely as a means of allowing Scotland to escape from an unsatisfactory constitutional position within the UK, but, more positively, as an opportunity for constitutional renewal. In other words, the constitutional discontents animating the desire for independence go beyond the territorial constitution to encompass a more comprehensive critique of the UK's political system: its 124 See C.E. Lindblom 'The Science of "Muddling Through" ' (1959) In the case of independence, the constitutional innovation was to be a written constitution, in contrast to the UK's 'unwritten' constitution, which would be developed through an inclusive and participatory process by an independent constitutional convention. 
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In addition, as Page points out in his chapter, the devolved institutions in Scotland already enjoy considerable organizational autonomy, which is set to increase further once the Scotland Bill is enacted. Undeniably, though, Scottish voters are not currently fully in control of their governance arrangements, which leaves them at risk of constitutional reforms which the majority do not support -such as EU withdrawal or human rights reform.
Viewed simply as an argument about where formal powers to undertake constitutional reform are situated, the constitutional renewal argument seems simply to be an example of the broader democratic case for independence. In fact, however, the point is a different one, namely that a new constitutional beginning would provide an opportunity and impetus for 132 See eg Scotland's Future (n 17) at 332, 334 -5. 133 Political Thought (n 33) at 50 -52. 134 Political Thought (n 33) at 52. Government therefore proposed -albeit acknowledging that its voice would be only one amongst many -that the constitution should contain extensive rights guarantees, as well as various substantive commitments, for instance to a ban on nuclear weapons and the sustainable use of natural resources.
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In envisaging a heavily substantive constitution, though, the Scottish Government left itself open to charges of inappropriate politicization of the constitution, of over-judicialization, and 143 Sturgeon Constitutional Future (n 59). 144 The possibility that the process of drafting a permanent, written constitution would have failed cannot of course be excluded. 145 Bulmer Scottish Constitutional Tradition (n 140) at 218. 146 Sturgeon Constitutional Future (n 59). 147 See Scottish Government Written Constitution (n 22) at para 1.10. A number of substantive commitments were also included in the draft Interim Constitution -Scottish Government Interim Constitution (n 135).
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of seeking illegitimately to bind future generations. It therefore sat uneasily with the claim that independence would enhance the democratic legitimacy of government in Scotland. The Scottish Government could also fairly be accused of complacency about the effectiveness of Scotland's existing democratic institutions, proposals for institutional and democratic reform being noticeably absent from its constitutional agenda. 148 However, there were voices during the referendum debate calling for more radical constitutional reforms, 149 and the constitutional convention would have provided an institutional platform for the articulation of such proposals -as well as for a broader debate about the appropriate form and content of the constitution.
VI. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to show that, despite the lack of clear evidence of constitutional discontent in Scotland ahead of the 2014 referendum, there was -and continues to be -a coherent constitutional case to be made for independence. However, certain tensions within the independence case, and the contestable nature of some of its assumptions, mean that it can be regarded as persuasive, but not incontrovertible.
Independence may reasonably be considered to be an answer to the problems identifiable in Scotland's current constitutional position, but it cannot be regarded as the answer.
The constitutional case for independence is also inescapably a nationalist one -however uncomfortable some Yes supporters may have been with that idea. It is a nationalist case because it hinges on the acceptance of the relevance of Scotland as a self-determining political community. Paradoxically, however, what allowed the Yes campaign to play down its explicitly nationalist character is precisely the non-controversial nature of that claim in the 148 Cairney Scotland's Future Political System (n 138). 149 See Bulmer Scottish Constitutional Tradition (n 140) at 218 -219.
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Scottish context. That fundamental point was conceded when the Scottish Parliament was established in 1999. Indeed, as I have also sought to demonstrate, there is a striking similarity between the constitutional arguments used to justify devolution and those used in support of independence.
In part, this may have been a matter of attempting to piggy-back support for independence upon the popularity of devolution. However, more fundamentally, I would argue that it also indicates that devolution did not fully answer the constitutional problems that its proponents identified. From this perspective, the apparent public satisfaction with Scotland's constitutional arrangements prior to 2011 may perhaps suggest quiescence rather than consent; in other words, it may have been attributable to the relatively favourable political and economic conditions during the first decade of devolution -political alignment between
Westminster and Holyrood and generous public spending provision -rather than to a more fundamental resolution of the underlying constitutional discontents.
150
In the wake of the independence referendum, political circumstances are very different andwhen combined with evidence about voters' primarily instrumental reasons for rejecting independence -cannot give supporters of the Union much comfort. As I have sought to argue in this chapter, finding a satisfactory constitutional home for Scotland within the Union is not likely to be easy. At present the constitutional direction of travel therefore appears to be towards greater autonomy for Scotland rather than towards any stronger cleaving to the Union. Only time will tell whether Scottish voters are prepared to take the further step towards independence; whether their attitude becomes one of 'why not?' or rather 'why bother?'.
